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Abstract
Adversarial black-box attacks aim to craft adversarial perturbations by querying input–output pairs of
machine learning models. They are widely used to evaluate the robustness of pre-trained models. However,
black-box attacks often suffer from the issue of query inefficiency due to the high dimensionality of the
input space, and therefore incur a false sense of model robustness. In this paper, we relax the conditions
of the black-box threat model, and propose a novel technique called the spanning attack. By constraining
adversarial perturbations in a low-dimensional subspace via spanning an auxiliary unlabeled dataset, the
spanning attack significantly improves the query efficiency of black-box attacks. Extensive experiments
show that the proposed method works favorably in both soft-label and hard-label black-box attacks. Our
code is available at https://github.com/wangwllu/spanning_attack.
1 Introduction
It has been shown that machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, are vulnerable to small
adversarial perturbations, i.e., a small carefully crafted perturbation added to the input may significantly
change the prediction results (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Biggio and Roli, 2018; Fawzi
et al., 2018). Therefore, the problem of finding those perturbations, also known as adversarial attacks, has
become an important way to evaluate the model robustness: the more difficult to attack a given model, the
more robust it is.
Depending on the information an adversary can access, the adversarial attacks can be classified into
white-box and black-box settings. In the white-box setting, the target model is completely exposed to the
attacker, and adversarial perturbations could be easily crafted by exploiting the first-order information, i.e.,
gradients with respect to the input (Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). Despite of its efficiency
and effectiveness, the white-box setting is an overly strong and pessimistic threat model, and white-box
attacks are usually not practical when attacking real-world machine learning systems due to the invisibility
of the gradient information.
Instead, we focus on the problem of black-box attacks, where the model structure and parameters
(weights) are not available to the attacker. The attacker can only gather necessary information by means
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of (iteratively) making input queries to the model and obtaining the corresponding outputs. Black-box set-
ting is a more realistic threat model, and furthermore, important in the sense that they could serve as a
general way to evaluate the robustness of machine learning models beyond neural networks, even when
the backpropagation algorithm is not applicable (e.g., evaluating the robustness of tree-based models (Chen
et al., 2019) and nearest neighbor models (Wang et al., 2019)).
Black-box attacks have been extensively studied in the past few years. Depending on what kind of
outputs the attacker could derive, black-box attacks could be broadly grouped into two categories: soft-label
attacks and hard-label attacks. Soft-label attacks assume that the attacker has access to real-valued scores
(logits or probabilities) for all labels, while hard-label attacks assume that the attacker only has access to the
final discrete decision (the predicted label).
However, black-box attacks, especially hard-label black-box attacks, usually require a large amount of
(usually > 10K) queries to craft an adversarial perturbation. The query-inefficiency issue restricts the usage
of black-box attacks in real applications, while online machine learning systems often set a limit on the
query number, or get paid according to the number of queries. More importantly, query inefficiency incurs a
false sense of model robustness.
We suspect that this query-inefficiency issue is primarily owing to the high dimensionality of the input
space, and therefore to verify the conjecture in this paper, we seek to reduce the number of queries by
reducing the dimensionality of the search space. To achieve this objective, we relax the conditions of the
black-box threat model by assuming that a small auxiliary unlabeled dataset is available to the attacker.
The assumption is reasonable: imagine that before attacking an image classification model, the attacker just
needs to “collect” some unlabeled images. Such images could even be available to the attacker in the absence
of any explicit collection, because in a normal attack process the attacker is given in advance target images
of which the predicted labels would be expected to change by crafting small perturbations.
With this small unlabeled dataset, we propose a technique named the spanning attack. Specifically, the
unlabeled dataset spans a subspace of the input space, and we constrain the search of adversarial perturba-
tions only in this subspace so as to reduce the dimensionality of the search space. This method is motivated
by the theoretical analysis that minimum adversarial perturbations for a variety of machine learning models
prove to be in the subspace of the training data, and thus the auxiliary unlabeled dataset plays as a substitute
for the original training data. We also show that this method is general enough to apply to a wide range of
existing black-box attack methods, including both soft-label attacks and hard-label attacks. Our experiments
verify that the spanning attack could significantly improve query efficiency of black-box attacks. Further-
more, we show that even a very small and biased unlabeled dataset sampled from a different distribution
from the training data suffices to perform favorably in practice.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. We present the random attack framework which captures most existing black-box attacks in various
settings including both soft-label attacks and hard-label attacks. It is a novel and clear interpretation
on the mechanism of black-box attacks from the perspective of random vectors.
2. We propose a method to regulate the resulting adversarial perturbation of any random attack to be
constrained in a predefined subspace. This is a general method to reduce the dimensionality of the
search space of black-box attacks.
3. We make preliminary theoretical analysis about the subspace where the minimum adversarial pertur-
bation has to be inside. Motivated by the analysis, we propose to reinforce black-box attacks (random
attacks) by means of constraining a subspace spanned by an auxiliary small unlabeled dataset. In
our experiments across various black-box attacks and target models, the reinforced attack typically
requires less than 50% queries while improves success rates in the meantime.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work about black-box at-
tacks. Section 3 introduces the basic preliminaries and our motivation. Section 4 presents our framework for
black-box attacks and proposes our general method to improve query efficiency. Section 5 reports empirical
evaluation results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Related work
Soft-label black-box attacks. Chen et al. (2017) showed that soft-label black-box attacks can be formu-
lated as solving an optimization problem in the zeroth order scenario, where one can query the function
itself but not its gradients. Since then many zeroth order optimization algorithms have been proposed for
black-box attacks, such as ZO-Adam (Chen et al., 2017), NES (Ilyas et al., 2018), ZO-SignSGD (Liu et al.,
2019), AutoZOOM (Tu et al., 2019), and Bandit-attack (Ilyas et al., 2019).
Hard-label black-box attacks. Hard-label black-box attacks are more challenging since it is non-trivial to
define a smooth objective function for attacks based only on the hard-label decisions. Brendel et al. (2018)
proposed a method based on reject sampling and random walks. Cheng et al. (2019) reformulated the attack
as a real-valued optimization problem and the objective function is estimated via coarse-grained search and
then binary search. Chen et al. (2019) proposed an unbiased estimate of the gradient direction at the decision
boundary, and an attack method with a convergence analysis. Cheng et al. (2020) proposed a query-efficient
sign estimator of the gradient.
Improve query efficiency of black-box attacks. Recently, the idea of relaxing the treat model to improve
query efficiency of black-box attacks has attracted increasing attention. Some work captured the idea of
transfer-based attacks (Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017): adversarial examples of a surrogate model
also tend to fool other models. Brunner et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2019) both assumed that a surrogate
model is available to the attacker. Therefore, the attacker could employ the gradients of the surrogate model
as a prior for the true gradient of the target model. Another work (Yan et al., 2019) proposed a soft-label
black-box attack method which employs an auxiliary labeled datasets. Multiple reference models are trained
with the labeled datasets, and a subspace is spanned by perturbed gradients of these reference models. Then
the true gradients of the target model are estimated in the subspace. The major difference from our work is
that their auxiliary dataset has to be labeled, whereas ours is unlabeled. Moreover, their auxiliary dataset is
much larger than ours owing to the need for training reference models. In the ImageNet case, we only need
less than 1,000 unlabeled instances, while Yan et al. (2019) require 75,000 labeled instances. Finally, our
method is more general, and can be applied to both soft-label and hard-label black-box attacks.
3 Background and motivation
First, we introduce the notations for black-box adversarial attacks. LetX = RD denote the input space where
D ∈ N+ is the dimension, and let Y = [K] denote the output space where K ∈ N+ is the number of labels.
The function c : X→ Y is a classifier which is the target model to attack, and makes decisions by
c(x) = argmax
i∈[K]
f (x)i,
where f : X → RK is the score function of the classifier, which outputs scores of all labels for the given
instance.
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Untargeted adversarial attacks. Given a radius  > 0 and a correctly-classified labeled instance (x, y) ∈
X × Y, an untargeted attack aims to find an adversarial perturbation δ ∈ X with the norm ‖δ‖ ≤  such
that the classifier predicts a different label for the perturbed instance x + δ from the original instance x, i.e.,
c(x + δ) , y.
Targeted adversarial attacks. Given a radius  > 0, a correctly-classified labeled instance (x, y) ∈ X×Y,
and a target label ytarget , y, a targeted attack aims to find an adversarial perturbation δ ∈ X with the norm
‖δ‖ ≤  such that the classifier predicts the label ytarget for the perturbed instance x+δ, i.e., c(x+δ) = ytarget.
Our paper will focus on untargeted attacks, while it is easy to extend to targeted attacks. Besides, we
focus on the `2 norm (Euclidean norm) perturbation where the magnitude of adversarial perturbations are
measured by `2 norm, and further research on general norms are left for future work.
Soft-label black-box attacks. The attacker has access to the score (logit or probability) output for any
input x in X, i.e., f (x). Therefore, any loss defined on the the pair of the score and the ground-truth label is
also available to the attacker. We denote the loss function as `f (x, y).
Hard-label black-box attacks. The attacker only has access to the final decision (the predicted label)
for any input x in X, i.e., c(x). It is more challenging than soft-label attacks as they have access to less
information.
Soft-label attacks query f (·), while hard-label attacks query c(·). The number of queries is the cost of
black-box attacks. It is an important issue to reduce the number of queries required when deploying attack
methods in real applications.
Criterion for black-box attacks. Given a budget B > 0, a radius  > 0, and a correctly-classified labeled
instance (x, y) ∈ X × Y, an untargeted black-box attack aims to find an adversarial perturbation δ with the
norm ‖δ‖ ≤  such that c(x + δ) , y is satisfied only by means of querying up to B times of f (·) in the
soft-label case or c(·) in the hard-label case. If the attack manages to find an adversarial perturbation within
the query budget (B queries), then we say the attack is successful; otherwise it is failed. Therefore, we have
two criteria for a black-box attack: (i) whether it is successful and (ii) the number of queries it executes.
In practice, the input space X is usually high-dimensional: for instance, the typical input image for an
ImageNet model has 224 × 224 × 3 = 150, 528 pixels. It is suspected that requiring such a large amount of
queries when searching for an adversarial perturbation δ in X is probably owing to the high dimensionality
of X. To verify our conjecture, a natural question for black-box attacks is as below:
“Is it possible to reduce the number of queries
by reducing the dimensionality of the search space?”
In this paper, we provide a positive answer to this question by proposing a method that reinforce black-box
attacks with a small set of unlabeled data.
4 Proposed method
We first introduce the concept of the subspace attack, and then propose a method which utilizes an auxiliary
unlabeled dataset to locate an appropriate subspace, namely the spanning attack.
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Algorithm 1: Gaussian random vectors in a subspace
Input: orthonormal vectors e1, e2, . . . , eN ∈ X which spans the subspace V, and the sampling routine
sample for Gaussian random vectors
Output: a Gaussian random vector in the subspace V
1 w ← sample(N)
2 return
√
D
N
∑N
i=1 wiei
4.1 Subspace attack
Definition 1 (subspace attack). A subspace attack is an adversarial attack which returns adversarial per-
turbations in a predefined subspace V ⊆ X.
Intuitively, the predefined subspace V can be seen as a prior for perturbations of adversarial examples. If
the subspace is small enough while still being able to capture most of small adversarial perturbations, then
due to the reduced dimensionality, it can significantly reduce the number of queries required for black-box
attacks.
We will focus on one type of black-box attacks, the random attack, which captures a wide range of
(nearly all existing) black-box attacks, and is convenient to incorporate the prior knowledge about the sub-
space, and thus easy to be transformed into a subspace attack.
Definition 2 (random attack). The resulting adversarial perturbation of a random attack is a linear combi-
nation of random vectors.
The following lemma highlights an intuition on how to transform a random attack into a subspace attack:
Lemma 1. If all random vectors of a random attack is constrained to be in a predefined subspace V, then
the random attack is a subspace attack with respect to V.
The proof is straightforward: a linear combination of vectors in a subspace is also in the subspace.
In literature, most of existing black-box attacks are random attacks — examples will be shown in Sec-
tion 4.2 and Section 4.3.
Random vectors of random attacks are typically sampled from the Gaussian distribution. Such Gaus-
sian random vectors are independent and identically distributed random variables sampled from a standard
Gaussian distribution. Let sample(d) denote the sampling routine for a Gaussian random vector of dimen-
sion d ∈ N+. Thus sample(D) will sample a Gaussian random vector in the original input space X. If we
could constrain the sampling routine in a subspace, by Lemma 1 the resulting attack would be a subspace
attack. Algorithm 1 displays how to sample a Gaussian random vector in a subspace. The subspace V is
characterized by an orthonormal basis, and the term
√
D
N guarantees that the returned random vector has the
same expected value of the length as the original random vector sample(D).
Note that the returned random vector of Algorithm 1 is a linear combination of the orthonormal vectors.
Therefore we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The returned random vector of Algorithm 1 is constrained in the subspaceV = span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ),
where span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ) returns the smallest space V that contains all the input vectors e1, e2, . . ., eN .
Therefore, applying Algorithm 1 to a random attack, we have a subspace attack as the following corollary
implies.
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Corollary 1. Given a set of orthonormal vectors e1, e2, . . ., eN ∈ X, any random attack using Gaussian
random vectors can be transformed into a subspace attack of which the corresponding subspace is V =
span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ) by means of replacing the sampling routine sample(D) via Algorithm 1.
Corollary 1 introduces a particular method to transform a random attack (black-box attack) into a sub-
space attack. It is noteworthy that the transformation is performed only by means of replacing sampling
routines. It does not require to project adversarial perturbations from the input space X to the subspace V
explicitly, and therefore causes as little negative impact as possible on the original random attack.
4.2 Case study: soft-label black-box attacks
We investigate a soft-label black-box attack framework of which the attack incorporates a gradient-based
optimization method and a backend zeroth-order gradient estimation method to search for adversarial per-
turbations. This framework captures a wide range of soft-label black-box methods (Ilyas et al., 2018; Liu
et al., 2019; Ilyas et al., 2019; Tu et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2019). The framework is summarized in Algo-
rithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Soft-label black-box attack framework
Input: score function f : X→ RK , and corresponding classifier c : X→ Y, correctly-classified
labeled instance (x, y) ∈ X × Y, and budget B ∈ N+
Output: adversarial perturbation δ or NULL
1 δ ← initializer()
2 while B > 0 do
3 if c(x + δ) , y then
4 return δ // successful
5 end
6 g ← gradient_estimator( f , x + δ, y)
7 δ ← gradient_based_optimizer(δ, g)
8 B← B − query_sum_within_the_iteration()
9 end
10 return NULL // failed
In this framework, random vectors could be introduced when initializing the perturbation, which is 0
or a random vector, and estimating gradients by the zeroth-order method. A typical example of estimating
gradients is the random gradient-free (RGF) method (Nesterov and Spokoiny, 2017), which returns the
estimated gradient in the form:
gˆ =
∑
i
`f (x + σui, y) − `f (x, y)
σ
ui,
where uis are unit Gaussian random vectors (Gaussian random vectors of length 1). Therefore, gˆ is a linear
combination of random vectors.
Then, the resulting adversarial perturbation is calculated by gradient-based optimization methods such
as projected gradient descent (Madry et al., 2018), all of which return linear combinations of the estimated
gradients. It follows that these attacks are random attacks and could be easily transformed into a subspace
attack via Algorithm 1.
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4.3 Case study: hard-label black-box attacks
Hard-label black-box attacks could be separated into two categories: methods based on random walks (Bren-
del et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019) and methods based on direction estimation (Cheng et al., 2019, 2020). In
the first case, a random walk consists of a succession of random vectors, i.e., the sum of random vectors; in
the second case, the gradient with respect to the direction towards the boundary is estimated by RGF or its
variant based on the sign of the finite difference. As we discuss before, these gradient estimation methods
typically return linear combinations of random vectors. In both cases, the resulting adversarial perturbation
is also a linear combination of random vectors, and as a consequence they could also be transformed into
subspace attacks obviously.
4.4 Spanning attack
The subspace V is a prior information for the subspace attack. To make a subspace attack perform well,
it has to be easier to find an adversarial perturbation in the subspace V than in original input space X.
The crux of subspace attacks is how to locate an appropriate subspace V. We propose to utilize an auxiliary
unlabeled dataset to span the subspace, which is motivated by the theoretical analysis regarding the minimum
adversarial perturbation.
Minimum (norm) adversarial perturbation. A minimum adversarial perturbation is the adversarial per-
turbation with the minimum norm. Formally, given a classifier c : X → Y and a labeled instance (x, y) ∈
X × Y, the minimum adversarial perturbation is defined as
δ∗ = argmin
δ
‖δ‖ s.t. c(x + δ) , y.
We first analyze the minimum adversarial perturbation of the nearest neighbor classifier. Given a labeled
instance (x, y) to attack, let S+ = {x+i }n
+
i=1 denote the training data of which labels are the same as x,
S− = {x−j }n
−
j=1 the training data of which labels are different from x, and S = S
+∪S− the whole training data.
Wang et al. (2019) derived a condition that the minimum adversarial perturbation of the nearest neighbor
classifier has to satisfy:
Lemma 3 (Wang et al., 2019). For any labeled instance to attack, there exist w ∈ Rn+ and j ∈ [n−] such
that the minimum adversarial perturbation of the nearest neighbor classifier is
δ∗ =
∑
i∈[n+]
wi(x−j − x+i ).
Then we have a straightforward corollary about the subspace in which the minimum adversarial pertur-
bation is.
Corollary 2. Minimum adversarial perturbations of the nearest neighbor classifier are constrained in the
space span(S).
7
Proof. By Lemma 3, we have
δ∗ =
∑
i∈[n+]
wi(x−j − x+i )
=
∑
i
wix
−
j −
∑
i
wix
+
i
∈ span(x+1 , x+2 , . . . , x+n+, x−1 , x−2 , . . . , x−n− )
= span(S).

Similar results on the minimum adversarial perturbation also hold for support vector machine (SVM)
classifiers (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995).
Lemma 4. Minimum adversarial perturbations of SVM classifiers are in the form
δ∗ =
∑
i∈[n+]
uix+i +
∑
j∈[n−]
vj x
−
j ,
where ui ∈ R and vj ∈ R are scalars.
Proof. For simplicity, we only consider SVM for binary classification, which can be easily extended by
strategies of one-vs-one or one-vs-rest. Let w denote the optimal solution of SVM. Then based on the
primal-dual relationship, we have
w =
∑
i
u′ix
+
i +
∑
j
v′j x
−
j ,
where u′i ∈ R and v′j ∈ R are scalars. When predicting a perturbed example, SVM calculates
〈w, x + δ〉 = 〈w, x〉 + 〈w, δ〉
= 〈w, x〉 + ‖w‖‖δ‖ cos(θ),
where θ is the angle between w and δ. Therefore, the minimum adversarial perturbation that flips the sign of
〈w, x〉 has to be in the direction of w with cos(θ) = 1 or in the opposite direction of w with cos(θ) = −1. 
Then we have the following corollary, which is a direct corollary of Lemma 4.
Corollary 3. Minimum adversarial perturbations of the SVM classifiers are constrained in the space span(S).
It is inspiring that K-NN and SVM have a great difference whereas share the same property:
“Minimum adversarial perturbations prove to be
in the subspace spanned by the training data”.
On the contrary, computing minimum adversarial perturbations for neural networks and tree-based ensemble
models has shown to be NP-hard (Katz et al., 2017; Kantchelian et al., 2016), and it is an open problem in
what conditions minimum adversarial perturbations for neural networks and tree-based ensemble models are
also in the space span(S). Nevertheless, Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 still motivate us to search for adversarial
perturbations in the space span(S).
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In practice, it is not applicable to assume the training data are available to attackers. To make a relaxation,
we assume that the attacker only has access to an auxiliary unlabeled dataset S′. By this means, subspace
attackers search for adversarial perturbations in span(S′), namely the spanning attack, i.e., the subspace
attack by spanning an auxiliary unlabeled dataset. For convenience, we simply term the auxiliary unlabeled
dataset as the subspace dataset. Moreover, since in the following only the subspace dataset is utilized for
attacks, we use S to denote the subspace dataset unambiguously.
By Corollary 1, given a subset dataset S, the spanning attack requires a set of orthonormal vectors
which is a basis for span(S) so as to transform a random attack into a subspace attack. We could make
it by the standard process of orthonormalization, which can be performed by the Gram-Schmidt process,
the Householder transformation etc (Cheney and Kincaid, 2010). Therefore, the overall procedures of our
spanning attack is as below:
1. Compute a basis of S by orthonormalization;
2. Transform the random attack into a subspace attack by Algorithm 1;
3. Attack the target model with the resulting subspace attack.
4.5 Selective spanning attack
The spanning attack searches for adversarial perturbations in the space span(S), which is a subspace of the
input space X. A natural question is whether it is possible to benefit more by means of explicitly selecting a
subspace of span(S) instead of using span(S) directly. We term the method which searches for adversarial
perturbations in a non-trivial subspace of span(S) as the selective spanning attack, as it selects a subspace
from span(S).
In the case of the selective spanning attack, the Gram-Schmidt process or Householder transformation
is not instructive enough to select a subspace of span(S), since there is no significant difference among the
derived orthonormal vectors.
Instead, we employ the singular value decomposition (SVD) to derive a set of orthonormal vectors
which is a basis of span(S). In particular, assume the subspace dataset has M different instances S =
{x1, x2, . . . , xM } and S ∈ RM×D is the matrix of which the j-th row is xᵀj . By SVD, S can be decomposed
into the form
S = UΣV ᵀ,
where U ∈ RM×M and V ∈ RD×D are orthogonal matrices and Σ ∈ RM×D is a diagonal matrix, of which
diagonal entries are singular values.
It could be proved that the right singular vectors (columns of V ) satisfy the following property:
Lemma 5. Right singular vectors of which the corresponding singular values are larger than zero are an
orthonormal basis for span(S).
Proof. Let N denote the number of non-zero singular values. Then, we have the compact SVD as
S = UNΣNV
ᵀ
N .
Let ei denote the i-th column of VN . The objective is to prove
span(S) = span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ),
which is equivalent to
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Illustration of top and bottom spanning attacks. The only difference between Figure 1a and
Figure 1b is the ground-truth labels. e1 and e2 are right singular vectors, and their lengths represent the
corresponding singular values. For an effective attack, the top spanning attack, i.e., selecting span(e1),
is better than the bottom spanning attack, i.e., selecting span(e2), in Figure 1a; whereas Figure 1b is the
opposite case.
• (i) span(S) ⊆ span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ) and
• (ii) span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ) ⊆ span(S).
For any a ∈ span(S), by definition there exists b ∈ RM such that
a = bᵀS = (bᵀUNΣN )V ᵀN .
Therefore, we have (i) span(S) ⊆ span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ).
By the compact SVD, we also have
Σ−1N U
ᵀ
NS = V
ᵀ
N .
Thus, for any a ∈ span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ), there exists b ∈ RN such that
a = bᵀV
ᵀ
N = (bᵀΣ−1N UᵀN )S.
Therefor, we have (ii) span(e1, e2, . . . , eN ) ⊆ span(S).

We denote these right singular vectors as e1, e2, . . ., eN with corresponding singular values larger than
zero, and they are sorted according to the corresponding singular values such that the singular values have
σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ . . . ≥ σN . Then, we have roughly two options for the selective spanning attack: selecting the top
singular vectors, and selecting the bottom singular vectors. We term these two options as the top spanning
attack and the bottom spanning attack respectively.
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Since the selective spanning attack does not require the label information, the top spanning attack and
the bottom spanning attack have their own advantageous situations depending on the labels of the underlying
data distribution. We illustrate two toy cases in Figure 1. In the first case, the top spanning attack is favorable
since we can find adversarial perturbations along e1, and the second case is the exact opposite. Roughly
speaking, top singular vectors represent directions along the manifold of the dataset, and bottom singular
vectors represent directions out of the manifold. It is believed that for high-dimensional datasets adversarial
examples widely exist in directions out of the manifold (Stutz et al., 2019). Therefore, the bottom spanning
attack would be a better choice in practice, which is validated in our experiments.
5 Experiments
In this section, we empirically validate the performance of the proposed spanning attack. Specifically, we se-
lect three representative black-box (random) attacks as baselines and employ the spanning attack to reinforce
them:
• The RGF attack (Cheng et al., 2019): a soft-label attack within the framework considered in the case
study for soft-label attacks;
• The boundary attack (Brendel et al., 2018): a pioneering widely-used hard-label attack based on
random walks;
• The Sign-OPT attack (Cheng et al., 2020): a state-of-the-art hard-label attack based on direction
estimation.
We perform untargeted black-box attacks on the ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009). Attacks are
performed against the pre-trained ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016), VGG-16 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2015)
and DenseNet-121 (Huang et al., 2017) from the PyTorch model zoo (Steiner et al., 2019), since these
architectures are diverse and representative. Correctly-classified images are randomly sampled from the
validation set as the evaluation dataset, of which every labeled image is the instance to attack. The size of the
evaluation dataset for soft-label attacks is 1,000, and the one for hard-label attacks is 100 for computational
efficiency. Another unlabeled 1,000 images are sampled from the validation set as the subspace dataset. The
evaluation dataset and the subspace dataset do not overlap. We set the perturbation radius  =
√
0.001D and
the budget B = 10, 000. If an attack method finds an adversarial perturbation δ within B queries such that
‖δ‖ ≤  holds, then this attack is successful; otherwise it is failed. Therefore, we have two criteria for a
black-box attack: (i) whether it is successful and (ii) the number of queries it executes.
All hyper-parameters of the spanning attacks are the same as the corresponding baselines. The only
difference is introducing an appropriate subspace via our methods. We refer to Cheng et al. (2019), Brendel
et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2020) for details of the baseline black-box methods.
5.1 Main results
Success rates, query means and query medians on the evaluation dataset are reported in Table 1 for ResNet-
50, Table 2 for VGG-16, and Table 3 for DenseNet-121. By convention only successful adversarial pertur-
bations are counted for query means and query medians. On the one hand, this criterion is favorable for the
method with a lower success rate and a lower query number on successful adversarial perturbations. On the
other hand, if a method has a higher success rate and a lower query number on successful perturbations than
the other, we would have more confidence to conclude that the first method performs better.
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Table 1: Comparison between the baseline black-box attacks and the resulting spanning attacks for ResNet-
50.
Success rate Query mean Query median
RGF (soft-label) Baseline 0.965 596.088 358.000Spanning attack 0.988 315.879 205.000
Boundary (hard-label) Baseline 0.720 4133.903 3291.000Spanning attack 0.880 3197.557 2569.500
Sign-OPT (hard-label) Baseline 0.970 2392.175 2143.000Spanning attack 1.000 1053.220 647.000
Table 2: Comparison between the baseline black-box attacks and the resulting spanning attacks for VGG-
16.
Success rate Query mean Query median
RGF (soft-label) Baseline 0.970 450.484 256.000Spanning attack 0.984 259.006 154.000
Boundary (hard-label) Baseline 0.810 3467.086 2787.000Spanning attack 0.940 2972.755 2263.000
Sign-OPT (hard-label) Baseline 1.000 1665.080 1450.000Spanning attack 1.000 840.900 572.500
Our results show that the spanning attack improves the baseline methods significantly in terms of both
success rates and query numbers, consistently across all baseline methods and all pre-trained target models.
In particular, in the case of the RGF attack and the Sign-OPT attack, the spanning attack only needs
approximately half of the queries of the baseline for a successful attack, and increases success rates in the
meantime. For example, in the Sign-OPT case for ResNet-50, the spanning attack improves the success rate
to 100%, and more crucially, it only requires 44% queries in terms of the query mean and 30% queries in
terms of the query median!
In the case of the boundary attack, while success rates of the baseline boundary attack within the given
budget is not satisfying, our spanning attack improves the success rates by a wide margin. For example, in
the Boundary case for VGG-16, the spanning attack improves the success rate from 81% to 94%.
Visualization of the subspace basis. A sample of vectors of the resulting orthonormal basis are visualized
in Figure 2. Note that these vectors reveal low-dimensional structures of the subspace rather than Gaussian
noise.
Examples of adversarial images. Several adversarial images, crafted by the baseline method and the
spanning attack, are displayed in Figure 3. All these adversarial images does not show any significant
difference from the original images due to the fact that they have the same small-norm constraint.
Since the results are consistent across different baseline methods and target models, in the following we
take the RGF attack and ResNet-50 as illustration by default to avoid unnecessary repetition.
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Table 3: Comparison between the baseline black-box attacks and the resulting spanning attacks for
DenseNet-121.
Success rate Query mean Query median
RGF (soft-label) Baseline 0.977 515.855 358.000Spanning attack 0.995 260.203 154.000
Boundary (hard-label) Baseline 0.670 3806.687 3389.000Spanning attack 0.890 3063.449 2261.000
Sign-OPT (hard-label) Baseline 0.980 2407.398 1863.500Spanning attack 1.000 1014.280 688.500
Figure 2: Visualization for vectors of the orthonormal basis.
5.2 Investigation on the subspace
In this section, we study to what extent the subspace affects the performance of the spanning attack.
5.2.1 Size of the subspace dataset.
We show attack performance with different sizes of the subspace dataset in Figure 4. In our experiments,
the minimum size is 100 and the maximum size is 1,000. In this scope, the larger the subspace size, the
better the performance of the spanning attack. In contrast, the baseline method is the extreme case where
the subspace size is D = 224 × 224 × 3 = 150, 528. Therefore, it is expected that the performance of the
spanning attack will reach the peak and then slide down as the subspace size increases. It is noteworthy
that even a small subspace dataset, ≈ 400 as shown in Figure 4, would help the spanning attack defeat the
baseline methods.
5.2.2 Distribution of the subspace dataset
We investigate whether it is necessary to sample the subspace dataset from the same distribution as the
training data. We sample 1,000 unlabeled images from the Flickr8k dataset (Hodosh et al., 2015), much
different from the ImageNet, as the subspace dataset. For comparison as an extreme case, we also show the
results of the spanning attack with a totally random subspace which is spanned by an unlabeled dataset of
which every image is sampled from a uniform distribution. In other words, the subspace is chosen totally
randomly without any prior knowledge.
The results are displayed in the middle area of Table 4. On the one hand, the results of the Flickr8k
spanning attack are still better than the baseline, and competitive with the spanning attack in Section 5.1,
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Figure 3: Examples of the adversarial images. The first row is the original images; the second row is
the adversarial images crafted by the baseline attack (Sign-OPT against ResNet-50); the third row is the
adversarial images crafted by the corresponding spanning attack.
where the subspace dataset is sampled from the ImageNet validation set. It suggests that conditions that the
subspace dataset has to obtain is not too strict in practice, and even a biased subspace dataset suffices to
work, which extends the application range of the spanning attack. The subspace dataset does not necessarily
has to be sampled from the same distribution with the training data.
On the other hand, the spanning attack with a totally random subspace performs even worse than the
baseline, which validates that prior knowledge given by the subspace dataset is necessary, rather than an
arbitrary low-dimensional subspace.
5.2.3 The bottom and top spanning attack
We investigate whether the selective spanning attack could further improve performance. In our experiments,
the bottom 800 singular vectors (remember the total number is 1,000) are used for the bottom spanning
attack, and the top 800 singular vectors are used for the top spanning attack. The comparison among the
original spanning attack, bottom spanning attack and top spanning attack are shown in the lower area of
Table 4. The results show that the bottom spanning attack could further improve performance, whereas the
top spanning attack has a negative impact. This is an empirical validation that adversarial perturbations are
more likely to appear in directions out of the data manifold, than along the data manifold, as discussed in
Section 4.5.
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Figure 4: Attack performance with different sizes of the subspace.
Table 4: Results of the spanning attack with Flickr8k subspace datasets, spanning attack with totally random
subspace (a subspace without any prior), bottom spanning attack and top spanning attack.
Success rate Query mean Query median
Baseline 0.965 596.088 358.0
Spanning attack 0.988 315.879 205.0
Spanning attack (Flickr8k) 0.988 322.228 205.0
Totally random subspace 0.957 714.893 409.0
Bottom spanning attack 0.988 299.205 154.0
Top spanning attack 0.988 334.485 205.0
5.3 More discussion with related work
Although the work of Yan et al. (2019) has a different setting with ours as discussed in Section 2, for
completeness we try to adapt their methods for comparison. They require an auxiliary labeled dataset, focus
on `∞ norm and only considers the soft-label black-box attack. In order to have a comparison, we let the
subspace dataset be labeled with size 1,000. We notice that with such a small subspace dataset in our
setting, Yan et al. (2019)’s method does not perform well. For instance, when attacking ResNet-50, it has
the success rate 58.7% and the query mean 641.283. The results for attacking VGG-16 and DenseNet-121
are similar (VGG-16: success rate 68.6%, query mean 558.044; DenseNet-121: success rate 59%, query
mean 623.603). It is primarily due to the fact that their method trains substitute models with labeled data.
As a consequence, when the dataset is too small, it is difficult to train reliable substitute models.
6 Conclusion
We propose a general technique named the spanning attack to improve efficiency of black-box attacks. The
spanning attack is motivated by the theoretical analysis that minimum adversarial perturbations of machine
learning models tend to be in the subspace of the training data. In practice, the spanning attack only requires
a small auxiliary unlabeled dataset, and is applicable to a wide range of black-box attacks including both
the soft-label black-box attacks and hard-label black-box attacks. Our experiments show that the spanning
attack can significantly improve the query efficiency and success rates of black-box attacks.
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